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DECIPHERING CERCLA'S VOCABULARY: UNITED STATES V
BURLINGTON - "REASONABLE" DIVISION AND
"ARRANGER" LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the pollution problems caused by toxic waste
sites throughout the United States, Congress passed the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) in 1980.1 CERCLA's objectives are to enable the gov-
ernment to quickly respond to environmental pollution, facilitate
immediate cleanup of hazardous waste sites and, after cleanup is
complete, force parties originally responsible for the pollution to
reimburse the government for its expenditures. 2 CERCLA is a strict
liability statute; 3 any proof that the defendant contributed to envi-
ronmental contamination is sufficient to establish liability.4 Addi-
tionally, when two or more defendants are responsible for the
contamination, a court may hold them jointly and severally liable.5
1. See Mark Yeboah, Case Comment, United States v. Atlantic Research: Of Settle-
ment and Voluntary Incurred Costs, 32 HARv. ENN-rL. L. REv. 279, 279 (2008) (discuss-
ing purpose and background of CERCLA); see also Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006) (detail-
ing rules, regulations and definitions under law).
2. See generally Martin A. McCroy, Who's on First: CERCLA Cost Recovery, Contri-
bution, and Protection, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 3 (1999) (discussing problems CERCLA
meant to address). For a further discussion of the history and purpose of CER-
CLA, see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
3. See McCroy, supra note 2, at 10-11 (noting CERCLA defendants are held
strictly liable for environmental contamination).
4. See Black's Law Dictionary 934 (8th ed. 2004) (defining strict liability). A
defendant is strictly liable even if there is no "actual negligence or intent to harm."
Id. Strict liability "is based on the Breach of an absolute duty to make something
safe .... Strict liability most often applies to either ultrahazardous activities or in
products liability cases." Id.
5. See American Law Encyclopedia, Joint and Several Liability, http://
law.jrank.org/pages/7842/Joint-Several-Liability.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2009)
(defining joint and several liability).
Joint and several liability is a form of liability that is used in civil cases where
two or more people are found liable for damages. The winning plaintiff in such a
case may collect the entire judgment from any one of the parties, or from any and
all of the parties in various amounts until the judgment is paid in full. In other
words, if any of the defendants do not have enough money or assets to pay an
equal share of the award, the other defendants must make up the difference.
Defendants in a civil suit can be held jointly and severally liable only if their
concurrent acts brought about the harm to the plaintiff. The acts of the defend-
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Furthermore, a court may impose joint and several liability on a
defendant even if a defendant contributed only minimally to the
total contamination and acted with reasonable care. 6 Joint and sev-
eral liability, however, is not triggered automatically under CER-
CLA. 7 In joint and several liability, harm is divisible among
potentially responsible parties (PRP) under both common law prin-
ciples and the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement).8
CERCLA has spawned prolific litigation against parties accused
of "arranging" for the disposal of hazardous substances which are
"owned or possessed" by the parties.9 Moreover, the fact that CER-
CLA does not specifically define "arrange for" makes litigation very
contentious.10 Courts have tried to formulate how and when to ap-
portion harm and how to define arranger liability in the numerous
complex scenarios that are often at issue in CERCLA cases."l United
6. See Steven L. Feldman & Stephen L. Crane, Spill Splitting, Los ANGELES
DAILYJ., May 30, 2007, available at http://www.gsalaw.com/article6.htm (discuss-
ing difficulties in avoiding joint and several liability); see also Black's Law Dictionary
1061 (8th ed. 2004) (defining negligence). A party that fails to "exercise the stan-
dard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation" and/or conduct that "falls below the legal standard established to pro-
tect others against unreasonable risk of harm" is negligent. Id.
7. See Lynda J. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CER-
CLA?, 28 U.C. DAvis. L. REV. 299, 325-26 (1995) (noting Congress and courts re-
ject mandatory joint and several liability for CERCLA defendants). The actual
statute does not mention joint and several liability, as Congress intended for courts
to decide CERCLA cases "on a case-by-case basis" using principles of common law
torts. Id.
8. See United States v. Agway, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547-48 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding evidence insufficient to prove divisibility). Agway, Inc. failed to pre-
sent evidence to the court demonstrating that its contribution to the contaminated
site requiring cleanup was divisible. Id. at 552. The court held that here, the vol-
ume of barrels of toxic substances that contributed to the total contamination was
not a reasonable basis upon which to apportion relative harm among tortfeasors
because it did not take into account the commingling of harmful chemicals, their
migratory potential and relative toxicity. Id. The court was careful to point out
however, that volume may be a reasonable basis for divisibility in some cases. Id.
9. See Aaron Gershonowitz, Comment, Superfund "Arranger" Liability: Why Own-
ership of the Hazardous Substance Matters, 59 S.C. L. REV. 147, 148 (2007) (listing four
categories of parties who may be liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA).
10. See id. at 156-58 (discussing court's reasoning in United States v. Cello-Foil
Products, Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995)). The court in Cello-Foil, defined "ar-
ranger for" to include an element of intent; if there was no intent to dispose of a
hazardous material, there was no arrangement for disposal. See Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d
at 1230-32.
11. See id. at 149 n.10 (noting disagreements among circuit courts on how to
determine arranger liability). The author cited two cases demonstrating ap-
proaches to arranger liability among circuit courts. Id. In one case, the Eleventh
Circuit found the defendant liable as an arranger even though the defendant did
not decide how, when or by whom hazardous wastes were to be disposed. Id. In
the other case, the Eighth Circuit held a plant supervisor liable as an arranger
2
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States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Railway Co. (Burlington) 12 demon-
strates the broad and harsh approach a court may take in finding
CERCLA liability. 13 In Burlington, the Ninth Circuit imposed joint
and several liability on three private parties - two railroad compa-
nies (Railroads) and Shell Oil Company (Shell) - which supplied
chemicals to a pesticide application facility in California.1 4 In its
holding, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the term "arranger" broadly
under CERCLA. 15 The ruling's expansive interpretation of ar-
ranger liability provoked a vigorous dissent due to the apparently
severe burden the broad definition would place on CERCLA de-
fendants.16 On October 1, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari "regarding the proper standard of review" and method of
dividing liability, under CERCLA, among parties that improperly
disposed of hazardous substances, thereby causing environmental
harm.17
This Note will evaluate the Ninth Circuit's decision to impose
joint and several liability on the defendants in Burlington, as well as
its finding that Shell was an arranger under CERCLA.18 Part I of
this Note recounts the facts of Burlington and the case's procedural
because he "knew about, supervised, and was directly responsible for arranging for
disposal of hazardous waste." Id.
12. 520 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Shell Oil Co. v. United
States, No. 07-1601, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 5437 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2008) (granting certiorari
to hear noted case).
13. See id. at 926 (refusing rehearing petition of prior decision en banc). The
Ninth Circuit held all three defendants jointly and severally liable for the contami-
nation at the parcel containing a pesticide storage and distribution facility, over-
turning a district court's determination that the harm was divisible. Id. at 943, 946.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found Shell Oil Company (Shell) liable as an arranger
because it sold and transferred chemicals to the pesticide facility knowing that
spillage of the chemicals was a part of the transfer process. Id. at 952.
14. See generally Norman A. Dupont, The Ninth Circuit's Burlington Northern Deci-
sion On Arranger Liability - Don't Cry "CERCLA " Over Spilt Bourbon?, ENvrL. LITIG. &
Toxic TORTS COMMITtEE NEWSL. (A.B.A. Sec. Env't, Energy, & Res., Chicago, Ill.),
June 2008, at 16, available at http://www.wileyrein.com/docs/publications/13664.
pdf (discussing facts and controversy surrounding Ninth Circuit Burlington
decision).
15. See id. (noting broad interpretation of arranger liability). For a further
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasons for broadly applying arranger liability, see
infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
16. See id. (noting dissent joined by eight judges). The author opined that the
number of dissenting judges suggested the weakness of the majority's reasoning in
applying such a broad standard to find arranger liability. Id. at 19.
17. See Public Citizen Litigation Group, http://action.citizen.org/t/6413/
content.jsp?contentKEY=4690 (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (listing recent cases
granted certiorari).
18. See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 952 (9th
Cir. 2008) (subjecting Shell to arranger liability).
2009]
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history. 19 Part III examines the background and history of CER-
CLA and discusses important cases regarding its application.20 Part
V explains the Ninth Circuit's reasoning behind its decision. 21
Part V provides a critical analysis of why the imposition ofjoint and
several liability was unwarranted and suggests that the Ninth Circuit
defined "arranger" too broadly.22 Finally, Part VI looks at the im-
pact Burlington may have on future CERCLA litigation should the
Supreme Court uphold the Ninth Circuit's decision. 23
II. FACTS
Brown & Bryant, Inc. (B&B), a now defunct company, owned
and operated an agricultural chemical storage and distribution fa-
cility in Arvin, California (Arvin site).24 In 1996, after spending
nearly eight million dollars to clean up soil and groundwater con-
tamination at the Arvin site, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) and California's Department of Toxic
Substances Control (DTSC) brought a CERCLA suit against B&B
and B&B's chemical supplier, Shell Oil Company (Shell), to force
the companies to pay cleanup costs. 25 The EPA and DTSC also
sued Burlington Railway Co. and Union Pacific Transportation Co.
(Railroads), which jointly owned a parcel of land at the Arvin site
and leased the parcel to B&B. 26
19. For a further discussion of the facts of Burlington, see infra notes 24-49 and
accompanying text.
20. For further background information on CERCLA, see infra notes 50-103
and accompanying text.
21. For a narrative analysis of Burlington, see infra notes 104-57 and accompa-
nying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Burlington, see infra
notes 158-99 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion on the potential impact of Burlington, see infra
notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
24. See Amy L. Gleghorn, Environmental Update: United States Court of Appeals,
14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 423, 423 (2007) (citing facts of United States v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 479 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007)).
25. See id. at 423 (citing facts). The Ninth Circuit found B&B, Railroads and
Shell jointly and severally liable for contamination at the Arvin site. Id. See also
United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co. (Atchison), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23130, at *226 (E.D. Cal., July 14, 2003) (holding Railroads liable for contamina-
tion at Arvin site and Shell liable as arranger but apportioning costs of harm), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom., United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 479
F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2007). The district court estimated the government's cleanup
costs to be $7,809,683.46 as of June 30, 1997, not including interest or attorneys
fees. Id. For a further discussion of the facts of this case and the holding, see infra
notes 23-24, supra notes 26-45 and accompanying text.
26. See Gleghorn, supra note 24, at 423 (reciting facts of ownership).
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At the Arvin site, B&B stored chemical Dichloropropane-
dichloropropene (D-D), a pesticide that can produce disease in ani-
mals and severe skin irritation and other maladies in humans.27
The chemical D-D, which is highly corrosive and can eat through
steel, was stored in converted stainless steel milk trailers. 28 Despite
the potential hazards, B&B placed these leak-prone trailers
throughout the Arvin site, including the Railroads' parcel. 29 At the
same location, B&B also stored similar rigs filled with other chemi-
cals, such as Nemagon and Dinoseb. 30
B&B purchased D-D from Shell, which transported the chemi-
cal to B&B's facility "'Free On Board' (F.O.B.) Destination" by way
of common carrier trucks. 31  F.O.B. signifies that the seller
promises to deliver goods "on board a vessel designated by the
buyer" and that the seller fulfills its obligations once the goods
"have passed over the ship's rail."32 When the trucks arrived at the
Arvin site, B&B employees unloaded and transferred the chemical
from the trucks to the B&B facility. 33 The unloading process was
done in a "messy" fashion, resulting in frequent chemical spills. 34
Moreover, although there was no evidence that D-D spills occurred
during actual transport from Shell to B&B, leaks and spills are "ex-
27. See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 955 (9th
Cir. 2008) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing facts of case). See also Cornell University
Pesticide Management Education Program, D-D Mixture (Nemafene) Chemical
Profile 6/84, http://magritte.psur.cornell.edu/profiles/fumigant/d-dmixture/
fumi-prof-dd.htrnl (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (discussing properties of Chemical D-
D). Chemical D-D is injected into the soil as a fumigant to kill parasites, worms
and weeds. Id. While it poses no great danger to wildlife if used appropriately and
according to government regulations, animals that are exposed to this chemical on
a repeated basis often suffer from liver and kidney disease. Id. Humans exposed
to the chemical may have bad skin reactions and respiratory problems and should
seek immediate medical attention. Jd.
28. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 931 (discussing facts of case). The agricultural
chemical storage and distribution facility was in use by B&B since 1960 and B&B
had leased part of its property to the Railroads since 1975. Id.
29. See Id. (noting B&B placed steel milk trailers on site).
30. See id. (listing chemicals B&B stored on site).
31. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 931 (discussing Shell's role in possible contami-
nation at Arvin site).
32. Investopedia, Free on Board - FOB, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
f/fob.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (providing definition of F.O.B.). See also
U.C.C. § 2-319(1) (b) (2003) (defining term F.O.B.). The U.C.C. states, "when the
term is F.O.B. the place of destination, the seller must at his own expense and risk
transport the goods to that place and there tender delivery of them." Id.
33. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 931 (describing transfer process of chemicals
from trucks to facility).
34. See id. (noting chemical spills occurred after transport of D-D to B&B).
2009]
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pected and inherent in the delivery... process. '35 The EPA and
DTSC discovered repeated leaks and spills of potentially hazardous
chemicals at the Arvin site and found that B&B did not fully comply
with several hazardous waste laws. 36
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Cal-
ifornia held that the Railroads and Shell were liable for the cleanup
costs under CERCLA. 37 The district court also ruled that the harm
at the Arvin site was divisible.38 The court apportioned nine per-
cent of the clean-up costs to the Railroads, which it determined by
multiplying the percentage of land owned by the Railroads, per-
centage of time the land was owned in relation to the total number
of years the B&B facility operated and the volume of hazardous sub-
stances attributed to the Railroads' parcel. 39 For Shell, the court
approximated "the percentages of leakage from various activities at-
tributable to Shell and multiplied them together to set Shell's pro-
portion of the total liability at six percent. '40 The district court
assigned B&B "one hundred percentjoint and several liability," but,
because the company was defunct by this time, the EPA and DTSC
were stuck with the remainder of the cleanup costs. 4 1
35. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23130, at *64 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2003) (discussing likelihood of leaks and
spills). The district court carefully noted that leaks and spills are "expected and
inherent in the delivery and the unloading process" Id. (emphasis added). See also
Burlington, 520 F.3d at 952, (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting no evidence of spills dur-
ing actual transport from Shell to B&B).
36. See Gleghorn, supra note 24, at 423 (discussing EPA and DTSC findings).
See also Burlington, 520 F.3d at 931 (discussing contamination at Arvin site). The
EPA and DTSC found that B&B discharged contaminated wastewater into a pond
located on its parcel. Id.
37. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 932 (noting holding of district court). For a
further discussion of the district court's holding, see infra notes 34-36, supra note
38 and accompanying text.
38. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 932 (citing district court holding).
39. See Gleghorn, supra note 24, at 423 (discussing apportionment of liability
between Railroads and Shell); see also Burlington, 520 F.3d at 932 (discussing calcu-
lation method in apportioning clean-up costs to Railroads). The district court in
calculating Railroads' portion of clean-up costs did so based on three factors: (1)
Railroads' parcel was 19.1% of entire Arvin site; (2) B&B leased the parcel from
the Railroads thirteen out of twenty-nine years the B&B facility operated (45% of
total time); and (3) the fraction of hazardous substances traceable to the Railroads
was 66%. Id. Multiplying these three factors equaled, when rounding upward, to
6% liability. Id. Moreover, the district court assumed a 50% rate of error and
decided to raise the Railroads' liability to 9%. Id.
40. Burlington, 530 F.3d at 932 (calculating apportionment of clean-up costs
to Shell). For a further discussion of Shell's liability according to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, see infra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
41. See Dupont, supra note 14, at 16-17 (discussing facts of case); see also Bur-
lington, 520 F.3d at 932 n.11 (discussing district court's apportioning liability).
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The EPA and DTSC appealed the district court's ruling, argu-
ing that the district court should have held Shell and the Railroads
jointly and severally liable for the entire judgment. 42 Shell cross-
appealed, arguing that it was not an arranger under CERCLA and
that the district court was therefore wrong to impose any cleanup
liability on the company.43
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the harm at the Arvin
site was theoretically divisible, but the district court's method of ap-
portionment was erroneous given that the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to establish a reasonable basis for apportioning
the liability. 44 The Ninth Circuit found the district court's appor-
tionment calculation to be faulty because it did not reasonably es-
tablish "what part of the contaminants found on the land in
question were attributable to the presence of toxic substances or to
activities on the Railroad parcel. '45 In response to Shell's argu-
ments, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Shell could not reasonably
demonstrate that its chemicals "had contaminated the soil in any
specific proportion as compared to other chemicals spilled at the
site."4 6
42. See Gleghorn, supra note 24, at 423 (discussing theories of EPA and DTSC
on appeal). The EPA and DTSC argued that Shell and the Railroads should be
held jointly and severally liable for the harm at the CERCLA site. Id.
43. See id. (discussing Shell's cross-appeal claim). Shell argued that it was not
a CERCLA arranger because it did not possess the chemicals once they were trans-
ferred to B&B and because it did not control the disposal process. Id.
44. See id. (summarizing Ninth Circuit holding on appeal); see also Burlington,
520 F.3d at 943 (discussing apportionment of Railroad's liability). The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that apportionment, if allowed, must be used in accordance with the
Restatement approach. Id. While finding that the district court's factual analysis
regarding land area, time of ownership, and types of hazardous substances was
"mostly correct," the district court's legal analysis using those facts was insufficient
to avoid joint and several liability. Id. For a further discussion of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning regarding imposition of joint and several liability, see infra notes
104-49 and accompanying text.
45. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 946 (stating faultiness of district court holding).
46. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 946 (discussing Ninth Circuit's ruling on Shell's
liability). See generally id. at 946-48 (rejecting district court's apportionment of lia-
bility upon Shell and holding Shell jointly and severally liable). The Ninth Circuit
criticized the district court's ruling regarding apportionment of liability to Shell,
stating,
[t]he district court assumed equal contamination and cleanup cost from
all the chemicals' leakage. This methodology entirely failed to account
for the possibility that leakage of one chemical might contribute to more
contamination than leakage of another .... [t]he district court's calcula-
tions were too speculative to support apportionment. Id. at 946.
For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's divisibility analysis, see infra notes
109-23 and accompanying text.
20091
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Shell
was an arranger under CERCLA. 47 The Ninth Circuit ruled that a
party could be an arranger even if the party had no intent to dis-
pose of a hazardous substance. 48 The court also determined that
there was sufficient reason to impose arranger liability on Shell be-
cause Shell owned the chemicals at the time of sale to B&B, pro-
vided B&B with guidelines on how to handle the chemicals and
generally seemed aware of B&B's sloppy environmental record. 49
III. BACKGROUND
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA to remedy the environmen-
tal problems caused by hazardous waste sites throughout the
United States.50 CERCLA gives the United States government the
power to take any action necessary to deal with the release, or po-
tential release, of hazardous substances into the environment. 51
Additionally, CERCLA empowers the government to force those po-
tentially responsible for environmental pollution to pay all cleanup
costs which the government has incurred. 52 CERCLA's key purpose
is to shift environmental cleanup costs from taxpayers to the pol-
luters who benefitted from disposing of hazardous substances in the
first place. 53 To establish a prima facie case for liability under CER-
CIA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the alleged CERCLA site is a "facil-
ity;" (2) there is a "release or threatened release" of "hazardous
substances" from the facility; (3) the release or threatened release
of hazardous substances has incurred "response costs;" and (4)de-
47. See Gleghorn, supra note 24, at 424-25 (ruling Shell to be an arranger).
48. See id. (stating Shell had sufficient control over and knowledge of trans-
port process of D-D to be arranger); see also Dupont, supra note 14, at 16-17 (dis-
cussing facts and controversy surrounding Ninth Circuit decision). The Ninth
Circuit slightly amended its opinion in rejecting a petition to rehear the case en
banc. Id. For a further discussion of arranger liability, see infra notes 75-97, 136-45,
166-94 and accompanying text.
49. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 951 (imposing arranger liability on Shell).
50. See McCrory, supra note 2, at 3-6 (discussing history of CERCLA and
problems CERCLA meant to address). As of 1999, the government estimated that
a third of the U.S. population lives within four miles of a CERCLA site. Id. at 4.
51. See id. at 6 (describing CERCLA's purpose). See also Randy Boyer, Note,
Morton International, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.: The Third Circuit Establishes
a Standard for CERCLA Arranger Liability, 17 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 201, 203 (2003) (dis-
cussing CERCLA's enactment). The initial "enactment of CERCLA was largely the
result of public outcry to incidents such as Love Canal, which garnered national
media attention and illustrated the consequences of many years of hazardous waste
mismanagement." Id.
52. See McCrory, supra note 2, at 6 (noting power CERCLA gives to United
States government to deal with soil and water pollution and polluters).
53. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 933 (discussing purpose of CERCLA).
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fendant belongs to one of the four categories of "potentially re-
sponsible parties" (PRPs) described in CERCLA section 107. 5 4
The majority of courts do not require the plaintiff to prove
causation in a CERCLA case. 55 The plaintiff need only show that
the defendant's hazardous substances were,
deposited at the site from which there was a release, that
the hazardous substances of the same type as the defen-
dant's were found at the site, and that the release caused
the incurrence of response costs or proof of a specific
causal link between the costs incurred in the cleanup and
the individual generator's hazardous substances. This is to
advance CERCLA's goal of prompt cleanup before lengthy
litigation apportioning liability. . . . [M]ost courts have
held that consideration of causation is proper only in allo-
cating response costs in contribution actions, not in deter-
mining liability.5 6
A. Strict Liability and Joint and Several Liability
CERCLA is a strict liability statute. 57 Any proof that the defen-
dant disposed of hazardous materials and that a plausible path ex-
isted for the substances to reach the contaminated site is sufficient
to establish liability.58 A court can even impose joint and several
liability on a defendant found to have released only "minute quanti-
ties of potentially hazardous material."59
While section 107 of CERCLA makes no explicit mention of
joint and several liability, it is widely accepted that Congress in-
54. See MAT rHEW BENDER & Co., INC., LEXISNEXIS GROUP, REGULATED SUB-
STANCES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT, 5-31 ENVTL. L. PRAc. GUIDE § 31.01 (MB 2008)
(listing factors to establish prima facie case under CERCLA).
55. See id. (discussing causation in CERCLA).
56. Id. (discussing role of causation in CERCLA cases). Some courts allow
causation to be considered in divisibility of harm analysis "by holding that a defen-
dant can escape liability where its hazardous substances did not contribute more
than background contamination, cannot concentrate to increase the toxicity of the
contamination, and did not exceed applicable state or federal environmental stan-
dards." Id. For a further discussion of causation as it relates to CERCLA, see supra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
57. See Feldman & Crane, supra note 6 (noting CERCLA is strict liability
statute).
58. See id. (explaining what is needed to be held liable under CERCLA). For
a further discussion CERC[A strict liability, see infra notes 59-67 and accompany-
ing text.
59. Feldman & Crane, supra note 6 (discussing ease in imposing joint and
several liability under CERCLA). Because CERCLA is a strict liability statute, de-
fendants have a higher burden in proving divisibility. Id.
2009] 283
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tended joint and several liability to be available for courts to impose
on PRPs.60 It was also inferred that Congress expected courts to use
common law principles and wanted courts to develop a federal
common law of joint and several liability in deciding CERCLA
cases. 61 Although joint and several liability is usually imposed in
CERCLA cases, it is not required in all circumstances. 62 The Re-
statement "is the starting point for divisibility of harm analyses in
CERCLA cases."163 Nevertheless, the Restatement applies only to
the extent that it is compatible with CERCLA provisions.64
Under the Restatement, one can apportion the harm caused
by two or more parties when "(a) there are distinct harms, or (b)
there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm. '6 5 A PRP can avoid joint and several liability
if it can prove that the entire harm is divisible; however, such proof
comes with a substantial burden.66 Furthermore, the Restatement
notes that certain harms are often incapable of any reasonable or
60. See McCroy, supra note 2, at 11-12 (discussing joint and several liability as
it applies under CERCLA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (discussing liabilities of
parties under CERCLA).
61. See McCrory, supra note 2, at 11-12 (describingjoint and several liability as
it applies under CERCLA). While deciding joint and several liability for CERCLA
defendants is generally guided by common law principles, CERCLA, "in sharp con-
trast to traditional common law torts ... does not require proof of causation prior
to the imposition of liability." Id. at 13. See also United States v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry., Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130, at *232 (E.D. Cal July 14, 2003)
(discussing how to analyze divisibility in CERCLA cases). For a further discussion
of the background on divisibility under CERCLA, see supra notes 57-60 and accom-
panying text, and infra notes 63-79, 104-39, 158-72 and accompanying text.
62. See United States v. Agway, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547-48 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting joint and several liability is not mandatory). For a further discussion of the
ruling in Agway, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
63. Atchison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130, at *232 (stating Restatement is first
step in divisibility analysis of CERCLA cases). The Restatement provides for appor-
tionment of harm among two or more parties where "distinct harms" are shown or
there is a reasonable basis to determine the contribution of each party to a single
harm. Id. at *233.
64. See United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 713-17 (8th Cir. 2001)
(overturning district court's decision granting government motion for summary
judgment on issue ofjoint and several liability and noting difference between Re-
statement and CERCLA). The court noted that whereas in the Restatement the
plaintiff bears the burden to show causation, in a CERCLA case, once the govern-
ment presents the essential elements of liability, the defendant bears the heavy
burden of proving divisibility. Id. at 718-19.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A (1965) (stating general princi-
ples and illustrations of apportioning harm among two or more parties).
66. See Agway, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (stating Congress' intent that CERCLA
make it difficult for PRPs to avoid joint and several liability). For a discussion of
Congress' intent in formulating CERCLA, see supra notes 1-8 and accompanying
text and infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
10
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accurate division and cautions courts against "making an arbitrary
apportionment for its own sake. '"
6 7
In In re Bell Petroleum Services (Bell),68 the government brought a
CERCLA suit to compel Bell and two other companies to pay the
cleanup costs incurred by EPA while dealing with groundwater pol-
lution caused by chromium discharge from a chrome-plating fac-
tory owned successively by the defendants. 69 The Fifth Circuit
looked to the Restatement to determine whether dividing the
harm among the defendants was reasonable.7 0 The court noted
that the Restatement only requires evidence "sufficient to permit a
rough approximation" of harm contributed by each defendant to
establish divisibility.71 The Fifth Circuit found that Congress
"clearly" did not intend a more stringent standard that would result
in automatic imposition of joint and several liability.72 Conse-
quently, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the defendants met their evi-
dentiary burden in proving that the harm was divisible. 73
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 433A cmt. i, illus. 14 (1965) (illustrat-
ing when divisibility is not possible); see also Atchison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130,
at **235-36 (discussing difficulty in proving divisibility of harm).
68. 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).
69. See id. at 892-893 (discussing facts of case). The three defendant compa-
nies were Bell, Sequa, and John Leigh. Id. They owned and operated the chrome
plant successively from 1971 until 1977. Id. at 892.
70. See id. at 903 (stating Restatement allows for divisibility of harm even if
evidence cannot show with certainty amount of harm contributed by each
defendant).
71. See id. at 904 n.19 (replying to dissent's accusation that majority was asking
for lesser standard than preponderance of evidence). The court's response to the
dissent stated, "Sequa is, of course, required to prove its contribution to the harm
by a preponderance of the evidence... Our point is that such proof need not rise
to the level of certainty." Id.
72. See id. (holding CERCLA does not mandate joint and several liability); See
also United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(rejecting claim that no joint and several liability exists in CERCLA). The court
rejected the defendants' argument that, "because joint and severally liability is not
expressly provided for in CERCLA, there is no basis for its imposition." Id. The
court in Chem-Dyne stressed that under CERCLA, defendant always bears the bur-
den of proof in showing that apportionment is possible. Id. Here, the court re-
jected volume evidence of hazardous wastes contributed by a particular defendant
as a basis for apportionment because in this case it was not "the volume of waste of
a particular generator is not an accurate predictor of the risk associated with the
waste because the toxicity or migratory potential of a particular hazardous sub-
stance generally varies independently with the volume of the waste." Id. at 811.
73. See Bell, 3 F.3d at 904 (holding defendants proved reasonable basis for
apportionment). The Fifth Circuit particularly noted that Sequa's use of volumet-
ric evidence was a reasonable one with which to prove that the harm was divisible.
2009]
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In United States v. Hercules, Inc. (Hercules),74 the government
sued to compel Hercules, Inc. and Vertac Chemical Corp., to pay
the cleanup costs of pesticide pollution from a chemical processing
plant and storage facility that the two companies operated succes-
sively. 75 On the issue of liability, the Eighth Circuit stated that any
evidence showing divisibility must be "concrete and specific.
7 6
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit stressed that if courts are in doubt
about divisibility, they should impose joint and several liability in-
stead of trying to make an approximation. 77 Hercules presented
the court with volumetric, chronological, and other types of evi-
dence to prove divisibility. 78 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit held
that the evidence Hercules presented was sufficient to demonstrate
a reasonable basis for divisibility. 79
B. Categories of PRPs and Arranger Liability
CERCLA provides four categories of PRPs: (1) the party that
currently owns and/or operates a facility; (2) the party that con-
trolled and/or operated a facility at the time hazardous substances
were disposed; (3) a party that "arranged for disposal" of hazardous
materials which the party owned or possessed; and (4) the party
that accepted hazardous materials for transport to a facility to be
disposed of, if that same party chose the disposal facility.80 CER-
CLA's definition of "disposal" includes "the discharge, deposit, in-
74. 247 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001)
75. See id. at 710-13 (reciting facts of case). The government originally built
the chemical processing factory. Id. at 711-12. In the 1940s it was owned by Rea-
sor-Hill Corporation, which produced pesticides such as Dioxin. Id. at 712. Her-
cules bought the plant from Reasor-Hill in 1961, and proceeded to bury and store
dioxin, but Hercules did not know of dioxin's deleterious effects until 1965. Id. In
1975, Vertac began shipping chemicals to off-site landfills. Id. A year later, Hercu-
les sold the landfill site to Vertac and by 1987 there were "nearly 29,000 waste-filled
drums at the site that contained waste materials .... Many of these drums had
corroded and leaked .. " Groundwater and soil contamination were found at the
site and at the landfills, and there was pollution in nearby neighbors' property. Id.
at 712-13.
76. See id. at 717-19 (ruling evidentiary burden in proving divisibility in CER-
CLA cases is high). Defendants who hope to avoid joint and several liability must
present enough evidence to do so, as Congress' intent was to place the burden of
proof on defendants in CERCLA litigation. Id.
77. See id. (recommending action for other courts in this circumstance to
take).
78. See id. at 719 (holding evidence presented by Hercules provided reasona-
ble basis for apportionment).
79. See Hercules, 247 F.3d at 719 (citing In re Bell Petroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889,
895-96 (8th Cir. 1993)) (remanding case to trial court to reconsider divisibility of
harm).
80. See Gershonowitz, supra note 9, at 148 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1)-(4)
(2006)) (listing four categories of potentially liable parties under CERCLA).
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jection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such...
waste... may enter the environment or... be discharged into any
waters, including ground waters." 81
In United States v. CDMG Realty Co. (CDMG) ,82 the Third Circuit
attempted to determine what "disposal" meant under CERCLA,8 3
and whether "disposal" required affirmative human conduct.8 4 In
CDMG, HMAT Associates (HMAT), the owners of contaminated
property (hereinafter, CERCLA site), sought contribution from the
prior owner of the contaminated property, Dowel Associates
(Dowel), after the government sued HMAT to compel it to pay
cleanup costs. 85 HMAT advanced a "passive" disposal theory, argu-
ing Dowel was a prior owner "at the time of disposal" because con-
taminants dumped on the land prior to Dowel's ownership spread
during its occupancy, even though it never actually dumped any
hazardous materials on the property.s6 HMAT also argued that
Dowel dispersed contaminants during soil investigations to deter-
81. United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (2006)) (noting CERCLA incorporates definition of "dispo-
sal" under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)). For a further dis-
cussion and analysis of "disposal", see infra notes 136-45, 166-76 and accompanying
text.
82. 96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
83. Id. at 710 (discussing meaning of "disposal").
84. See id. at 710, 715 (holding "disposal" has strong connotations of active
conduct).
85. See id. (describing reasons for HMAT's contribution action against
Dowel). The EPA began investigating the property, located in Morris County, New
Jersey, which was formerly a landfill that received large amounts of hazardous
chemical wastes. Id. at 711. In the 1970s, the EPA investigated pollution from the
landfill and finally listed it as a serious hazardous waste site in 1982, the year after
Dowel had purchased the property. Id. In 1984, the EPA notified Dowel that it
could potentially be liable for cleanup costs at the site. Id. at 712. In 1989, a
CERCLA action was commenced against HMAT, the current owners of the prop-
erty. Id. Dowel was not sued by the government, but HMAT filed a third-party suit
against Dowel for contribution. Id. Dowel moved for summary judgment, claim-
ing that because the company did not "actively engage in waste disposal during
their ownership of the property," it was not liable under CERCLA. Id. The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Dowel's motion for
summary judgment, which HMAT appealed. Id.
86. Id. at 710 (describing HMAT's theory of disposal); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1)-(4) (2006) (describing categories of potentially liable parties). The
statute imposes liability on "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of." Id.
2009]
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mine whether buildings could be constructed on the property.87
HMAT contended that these actions constituted a "disposal."88
The Third Circuit rejected HMAT's first theory, but vacated
summary judgment and remanded the case to allow HMAT to pre-
sent evidence on its second theory.89 Moreover, the court avoided
the issue whether "disposal" always requires active human con-
duct.90 Nevertheless, using a common dictionary definition, the
court found a strong argument for requiring "disposal" to include
an affirmative act.91 According to the Third Circuit, the words in
CERCLA surrounding "spilling" and "leaking" - "discharge,"
"dumping," "injection," and "placing" - all envision some human
conduct, meaning Congress may have intended these words to de-
note affirmative acts. 92
Additionally, CERCLA fails to define "arranged for," creating
another ambiguity for which the courts must furnish a definition. 93
87. See CDMG, 96 F.3d at 710 (discussing HMAT's arguments against Dowel).
88. See id. at 710 (describing HMAT's active theory of disposal). The district
court ruled, "drilling activities did not cause a significant enough disturbance to
trigger liability." Id. at 712.
89. See id. at 711 (vacating summary judgment and remanding case). The
Third Circuit held that no threshold existed on what level of disturbance may con-
stitute "disposal", and that HMAT may present evidence at trial that Dowel negli-
gently conducted soil investigations, resulting in the spread of hazardous materials.
Id.
90. See id. at 714 (avoiding issue of whether disposal always requires active
human conduct).
91. See id. (noting strong argument for "disposal" to require active conduct).
The court noted that the words used in CERCLA to give meaning to "disposal"
such as spilling and leaking have been used by other courts to hold that passive
migration of contaminants constituted disposal, since "leaking" and "spilling" are
not words that generally denote active conduct. Id. The Third Circuit however
looked to an ordinary dictionary definition and found that these words also have
meanings that denote active human conduct. Id.
92. See CDMG, 96 F.3d at 714 (discussing Congressional intent from choice
and context of words in CERCLA). The court noted that the words surrounding
"leaking" and "spilling" in the CERCLA statute are "discharge," "deposit," "dump-
ing," "injection," and "placing," all of which indicate some affirmative human ac-
tion. Id. "Spilling" can also mean "to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall out,"
and "leak" can mean "to permit to enter or escape through a leak." Id. Neverthe-
less, the court did not deny the possibility that these words could also apply to
passive instances of disposal. Id. The court agreed that "leaking" and "spilling" do
not always require active human conduct, that one definition of leak is "to enter or
escape through a hole, crevice, or other opening", and that this was the definition
most favorable to HMAT. Id. Nevertheless, HMAT did not offer evidence of any
leaking drums from Dowel. Id.
93. Paul M. Hauge, Third Circuit Addresses Scope of "Arranger" Liability Under
CERCLA: Mere Ownership or Possession of Hazardous Substances is Insufficient, GIBBONS,
P.C., Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.gibbonslaw.com/news-publications/articles.php?
action=display-publication&publication-id=1236 (noting absence of statutory defi-
nition of "arranged for").
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While the "arranged for" provision certainly covers companies that
send hazardous material to landfills, it is unclear whether this provi-
sion also covers companies that "arrange for disposal" of chemicals
without the intent to dispose of them, "such as by sending useful
chemicals to a facility for processing that results in spills... of some
of those chemicals."94 In response to this ambiguity, three different
approaches have emerged among the circuit courts: "(1) a strict
liability approach; (2) a specific intent approach; and (3) a totality
of the circumstances or case-by-case approach.1
9 5
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Shell Oil Co. (Shell Oil)9 6
ruled that control of the manner of disposal was critical in deter-
mining arranger liability.97 In Shell Oil, two oil companies con-
tracted with the Federal Government to produce special high-
octane fuel for the military, which produced toxic byproducts dur-
ing the refining process.9 8 The byproducts, dumped at a landfill
site, resulted in contamination that the government cleaned up.99
After the government sued the oil companies under CERCLA to
recover the cleanup costs, the oil companies counter-claimed under
a broad arranger theory; the companies argued that the govern-
ment was liable because it had sufficient authority over the process
that produced the hazardous wastes.' 00
94. Hauge, supra note 93 (discussing arranger liability); see also Morton Int'l,
Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 2003) (listing most impor-
tant factors to determine arranger liability). The court stated "we conclude that
the most important factors in determining 'arranger liability' are: (1) ownership or
possession; and (2) knowledge; or (3) control. Ownership or possession of the
hazardous substance must be demonstrated, but this factor alone will not suffice to
establish liability." Id.
95. Boyer, supra note 51, at 204-05 (describing approaches taken by circuit
courts in finding arranger liability). For a further discussion of arranger liability,
see supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
96. 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. See id. at 1059 (holding control is critical element to determine arranger
status); see also United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 744-46 (8th
Cir. 1986) (holding anyone exercising some control and authority over hazardous
substances and disposal may be liable under CERCLA).
98. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1045-51 (discussing facts of case).
99. See id. (describing facts of production and disposal of toxic byproducts).
The oil companies and the government contracted for production of the high-
octane petroleum during World War II. Id. at 1048. The government knew that
the production process resulted in toxic byproducts and took "some actions to
alleviate the problem of waste disposal." Id. at 1051. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment did not specifically order the disposing of the toxic waste or issue any specific
approval of where and/or how the wastes were to be disposed. Id.
100. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055 (describing oil companies' theory of ar-
ranger liability). The oil companies argued that liability is imposed on a party
when that party "has substantial control over a manufacturing process wherein a
hazardous waste stream is generated and disposed of." Id. This leads to an obliga-
tion "to control the disposal of that waste stream." Id. The United States District
2009]
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Despite the arguments proffered by the oil companies, the
Ninth Circuit held that the government was not an arranger. 01 Al-
though the Ninth Circuit agreed that control is an essential ele-
ment in determining arranger liability, the court nevertheless
found the government never owned any of the waste products, did
not exercise any control over waste disposal and did not even have
an obligation to control the manner of waste disposal. 10 2 The hold-
ings in CDMG and Shell Oil, therefore, demonstrate that courts view
arranger liability as involving some form of active participation in
the disposal process. 10 3
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Burlington, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's rul-
ing and held that the Railroads and Shell were both jointly and
severally liable for the entire harm at the Arvin site. 10 4 In so hold-
ing, the court rejected geographic considerations, time of owner-
ship and volumetric evidence presented to support divisibility.10 5
The Ninth Circuit held that in this case, such factors were legally
Court for the Central District of California, which at trial agreed that the U.S. was
liable as an arranger, based its ruling on the precedent case of United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp. (Aceto), 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). Shell Oil, 294
F.3d at 1055. In Aceto, a pesticide manufacturer, Aceto, shipped its chemicals to
another company, Aidex, which blended them with other ingredients to produce
pesticides that could be sold commercially. See Aceto, 972 F.2d at 1375. The com-
pany then shipped the finished products back to the original manufacturer or to
customers of the manufacturer. Id. The manufacturers, at all times, owned the
pesticide ingredients and the finished commercial-grade pesticide products. Id.
The generation of toxic wastes at the Aidex plant was an "'inherent' part of the
formulation process, through such things as spills, cleaning of equipment, and
mixing and grinding operations." Id. The Eighth Circuit ruled that Aceto was an
arranger because its client, Aidex, performed a process on products owned by
Aceto and for Aceto's benefit and "at their direction." Id. at 1381.
101. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1056-59 (ruling government was not arranger
under CERCLA).
102. See id. (ruling on arranger liability). The court noted the differences
between this case and Aceto. Id. at 1056. Here, unlike in Aceto, the government was
the "end purchaser" of the fuel and thus more akin to a customer of the manufac-
turer in Aceto than the manufacturer itself. Id. In addition, the government never
had ownership of the raw materials or its intervening products. Id. It also never
owned "unrefined petroleum, refined gasoline, fresh sulfuric acid, spent acid, or
alkylate or any other additive." Id. Moreover, unlike Aceto, the government never
contracted out "a crucial and waste-producing intermediate step in a manufactur-
ing process, and then seek to disclaim responsibility for the waste generated dur-
ing that step." Id.
103. For a further background discussion on arranger liability, see supra notes
80-95 and accompanying text.
104. See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 943-47
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding Shell and Railroads jointly and severally liable).
105. See id. (finding no reasonable basis for divisibility).
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insufficient. 10 6 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Shell
was an arranger, even though it did not intend to dispose of the
chemicals, because it owned the chemicals at the time of sale and
transport to B&B and also provided guidelines for B&B to follow in
handling the chemicals.1 0 7  Moreover, Shell seemed generally
aware that chemical spills were occurring at the B&B facility. 10 8
A. Divisibility
In imposing joint and several liability on Shell and the Rail-
roads, the Ninth Circuit stated that harm might be divisible if a rea-
sonable basis for divisibility existed. 10 9 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit cautioned that divisibility analysis in CERCLA cases must be
"carefully limited."'1 10 To do otherwise would undermine CER-
CLA's strict liability principles, "'because defendants who can show
the harm is divisible, and that they are not responsible for any of
the harm' could whittle their liability to zero.""' A PRP status "pre-
mised on ownership of a facility does not require any involvement
in the disposal of hazardous substances[;]" therefore a PRP cannot
"cause" contamination on its property simply by owning land on
which another party disposes of toxic waste."l 2 To allow landowner
PRPs to use traditional causation analysis to prove that they were
not wholly liable would "undermine the premise on which the stat-
ute designated them as PRPs to begin with."
113
106. See id. (holding evidence presented was insufficient to show reasonable
basis for apportionment). For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning
on divisibility, see infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
107. See id. at 948-52 (imposing arranger liability on Shell). For a critical anal-
ysis of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in imposing arranger liability, see infra notes
166-94 and accompanying text.
108. See id. (imposing arranger liability on Shell). The Ninth Circuit sup-
ported its finding that Shell was aware that chemical spills and leaks were occur-
ring at the facility by pointing out that "Shell regularly would reduce the purchase
price of the D-D, in an amount the district court concluded was linked to loss from
leakage." Id. at 951.
109. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 926 (holding reasonable basis test for appor-
tionment) (citing United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 717 (8th Cir. 2001)).
For a further discussion of the facts of Burlington, see supra notes 24-49 and accom-
panying text.
110. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 929 (stating limit needed on divisibility
analysis).
111. Id. (citing United States v. Twp. of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318 (6th Cir.
1998)) (stating divisibility analysis weakens strict liability principle of CERCLA).
112. See id. at 938 (noting inapplicability of causation in CERCLA analysis).
For a further discussion of causation and its applicability to CERCLA cases, see
supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
113. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 938 (arguing traditional causation analysis
would undermine purpose for PRP designation).
2009]
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A landowner PRP can establish divisibility only by proving that
no contaminants are traceable to his or her portion of land at the
time of disposal. ' 4 That a defendant cannot realistically keep pre-
cise records of all of his or her contaminants is understandable, but
here it was fatal to the defendants' case."15 The Ninth Circuit in
Burlington held that the Railroads failed to establish that a reasona-
ble basis for divisibility existed because the Railroads could not sup-
ply the court with very precise records proving the exact amount of
contaminants traceable to only the activities on their parcel. 116
Divisibility of harm for an arranger, on the other hand, is more
straightforward,' 17 since its focus is on the manner in which dispo-
sal takes place. ' 18 In Bell and Hercules, the Ninth Circuit first looked
to see if, theoretically, a basis for divisibility existed. 119 The court
then investigated whether the defendants' evidence sufficiently es-
tablished a reasonable basis for divisibility. 120 Finally, the court
looked to see whether the district court erred in finding that a rea-
sonable basis existed. 121
114. See id. at 943 (describing how landowner can prove divisibility).
115. See id. at 944-45 (holding precise records crucial to show divisibility).
The court noted that had more precise records been kept, it would have been
possible for the Railroads to show the exact amount of leakage attributable to the
Railroads and amount of leaked chemicals that traveled onto the B&B parcel. Id. at
944. The court found that keeping such records, as it demanded, is difficult and
impracticable and that it is understandable why the Railroads did not keep such
records. Id. Nevertheless, failure to keep these records resulted in the Railroads
not being able to provide enough evidence to the court to support apportioning
liability. Id. at 945.
116. See id. (noting lack of more precise records). The Ninth Circuit stated
that if better and more precise records were presented, "it would be possible to
estimate the amount of leakage attributable to activities on the Railroad parcel,
how that leakage traveled to and contaminated the soil and groundwater under
the Arvin parcel, and the cost of cleaning up that contamination." Id. at 944. The
Ninth Circuit found that the precise records it demands companies to supply to
prove divisibility are impracticable to keep and the result may be unfair. Id. Nev-
ertheless, "these practical considerations cannot justify a 'meat-axe' approach to
the divisibility issue, premised on percentages of land ownership, as a means of
adjusting for the difficulties of proving divisibility with precision when PRP status is
based on land ownership alone." Id. at 944-45.
117. See id. at 938 (describing how categories of PRPs can establish
divisibility).
118. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 938 (describing how categories of PRPs can
establish divisibility). For a further discussion on establishing divisibility in CER-
CLA cases, see supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
119. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 942 (citing United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247
F.3d 706, 719 (8th Cir. 2001)) (describing first part of test in reviewing existence of
reasonable basis for divisibility).
120. See id. at 942 (describing second part of test in reviewing existence of
reasonable basis for divisibility).
121. See id. at 943 (questioning district court's finding of divisibility).
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The Ninth Circuit found that the harm at the Arvin site was
theoretically divisible, because some contamination occurred
before the Railroads' parcel became a part of the B&B facility, how-
ever, not all harmful substances were stored on the Railroads' prop-
erty and Shell sold only some of the chemicals to B&B that spilled
at the site. 122 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit overturned the dis-
trict court, ruling that although divisibility was theoretically possi-
ble, the defendants failed to prove divisibility was reasonable.1 23
1. The Railroads' Apportionment
The Ninth Circuit held the Railroads could only establish divis-
ibility by proving that no contaminants were traceable to the land
owned by the Railroads during the disposal of any toxic sub-
stances.1 24 The district court's opinion included eighty pages of
factual findings and relied on percentages of land, time of owner-
ship and types of products in finding that a reasonable basis for
divisibility existed.1 25 While the facts provided were not in dispute,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that they failed to support a reasonable ba-
sis for divisibility.126
Instead, the Ninth Circuit noted that mere percentage of land
owned and used, by itself, cannot provide a reliable basis for tracing
the proportion of toxic leaks, contamination or cleanup costs that
are associated with the whole site. 127 The court recognized that
CERCLA does not premise liability for contamination on just parts
of a facility but rather upon the whole. 128 Moreover, the court
found that the period of ownership of the land was not a reasona-
122. See id. (describing possibility of showing divisibility). For a further discus-
sion of the details of the case, see supra notes 24-49 and accompanying text.
123. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 943 (holding no reasonable basis for appor-
tionment of harm existed).
124. See id. (describing criterion for Railroads to establish divisibility).
125. See id. (describing district court's findings).
126. See id. (rejecting district court's rationale for apportionment).
127. See id. (citing United States v. Rohm &Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1285 (3d Cir.
1993) (rejecting percentage of land as rational basis to apportion harm). For a
critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's rejection of land percentage as a basis to
apportion harm, see infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
128. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 944 (noting operations at Arvin site were dy-
namic with many processes regarding chemicals happening throughout facility).
The court noted that some fertilizer rigs were stored on Railroads' parcel and fil-
led on B&B's parcel, pesticide cans were stored on Railroads' parcel before dispo-
sal, and chemical storage tanks were placed all over the facility. Id. The court held
that a "simple calculation of land ownership" is not capable of capturing "any data
that reflects this dynamic, unitary operation of the single Arvin facility." Id.
20091
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ble basis for divisibility. 129 The Ninth Circuit noted that the district
court assumed a constant rate of contamination "traceable to the
facility as a whole for each time period."' 30 Yet, according to the
Ninth Circuit, there was no evidence to support the district court's
assumption.' 3 ' The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court
erred in relying on the proportion of the types of hazardous sub-
stances present on the Railroads' parcel. 13 2 Although there was no
evidence "as to which chemicals spilled on the parcel, where on the
parcel they spilled, or when they spilled[,]" 3 3 there was evidence of
potential D-D leakage on the Railroads' parcel, which "the district
court excluded from its calculations.' 13 4 The Ninth Circuit, there-
fore, concluded that the Railroads did not prove their case for
divisibility.' 3 5
2. Shell's Apportionment
Moreover, according to the Ninth Circuit, Shell also presented
insufficient evidence to warrant divisibility.' 3 6 The court held that
no reasonable basis for divisibility existed because Shell failed to
supply "more precise estimates of the average volume of leaked
chemicals during the transfer process."' 3 7
129. See id. at 945 (holding period of ownership not reasonable basis for
divisibility).
130. Id. (criticizing district court's reasoning in finding divisibility). See also
United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding
ownership of portion of land is alone not enough to establish divisibility). In Rohm
& Haas, the defendants, Rohm & Haas (R&H), owned a 120-acre landfill in Penn-
sylvania and leased part of the landfill to Chemical Properties, Inc. (CP). Id. at
1268. After discovering that R&H disposed hazardous wastes at the site, the EPA
brought a CERCLA suit against R&H and CP. Id. CP tried to avoid joint and
several liability by arguing that the court could apportion the harm according to
the small percentage of land at the site that CP owned. Id. at 1279. The Third
Circuit rejected evidence of land ownership alone as a reasonable basis for appor-
tionment. Id. at 1280. The Third Circuit stated that "to warrant apportionment, a
defendant cannot simply provide some basis on which damages may be divided
.... CP must prove that there is a way to determine what portion of the 'harm'...
is fairly attributable to CP." Id.
131. See Burlington,, 520 F.3d at 945 (finding no evidence to support district
court's holding).
132. See id.
133. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 945 (criticizing district court's divisibility analysis).
134. Id. (criticizing district court failure to include potential D-D leaks).
135. See id. at 946 (holding Railroads failed to provide reasonable basis for
divisibility). For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, see infra notes
158-99 and accompanying text.
136. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 946 (holding evidence insufficient to estab-
lish divisibility).
137. Id. (finding Shell failed to provide adequate evidence to support divisi-
bility). Shell had only provided evidence as to leaking, but according to the court,
this was inadequate. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that, "contamination - as dis-
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Furthermore, in assuming "equal contamination and cleanup
costs from all the chemicals' leakage," the district court failed to
account for the possibility that each leaked chemical contributed
different levels of contamination. 13 8 Providing only evidence of
leakage, Shell could not prove a reasonable basis for divisibility. 139
B. Arranger Liability
In interpreting "arranger liability," the Ninth Circuit adopted a
broad view, citing Shell Oil.140 The court defined arranger liability
as a transaction that contemplates hazardous substance disposal "as
a part of, but not the focus of the transaction." 141 Although no
direct contract for disposal existed, the court noted that this was a
tinct from leakage - is the necessary consideration." Id. The court wanted to see
proof of a relationship "between waste volume, the release of hazardous sub-
stances, and the harm at the site." Id. (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988)). Further, the court stated, "volumetric calculations of
contaminating chemicals - those remaining in the environment and requiring
cleanup - could be sufficiently specific for apportionment." Id. (citing United
States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 719 (8th Cir. 2001)).
138. See id. (faulting district court's assumption of equal contamination and
cleanup costs from all leaked chemicals). The Ninth Circuit also noted that differ-
ent chemicals present have different cleanup costs. Id.
139. See id. (holding leakage or disposal evidence alone insufficient to prove
divisibility). The Ninth Circuit stated Shell could not provide enough evidence to
show even "a rough approximation" of contamination that remained at the Arvin
site "either directly or through the presumption that the pro rata cost of remediat-
ing contamination is likely to be equivalent to a PRP's pro rata share of contamina-
tion." Id. Additionally, even the approximation of leakage was too speculative to
prove divisibility. Id. To support its proposition, the Ninth Circuit cited Chem-
Nuclear Sys. v. Bush, 292 F.3d 254, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Id. In Chem-Nuclear, the
defendant disposed drums filled with hazardous waste. Id. Eighty drums were
directly attributable to the defendant. Id. The defendant could not prove that "it
was responsible for only those eighty drums, and therefore was not entitled to
apportionment." Id. at 946-47. Additionally, though the defendant "provided evi-
dence supporting inferences regarding where its drums went, the court refused to
accept these inferences as sufficient proof." Id. at 947. The Ninth Circuit criti-
cized the district court for estimating the "volume of Shell's chemicals that leaked
from each transfer based on data samples that do not readily extrapolate to total
leakage over the entire twenty-three-year period that Shell supplied B&B with D-
D." Id. The Ninth Circuit found that each of the district court's estimates was too
speculative to warrant apportionment. Id. The Ninth Circuit did state, however,
that Shell's specific contribution to the contamination was easier to ascertain than
that of the Railroads. Id. at 946.
140. See id. at 948 (discussing "broad arranger liability"). For a further discus-
sion of broad arranger theory in Shell Oil, see supra notes 96-100 and accompany-
ing text.
141. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 948 (defining broad arranger liability). See also
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding United
States not considered arranger under CERCLA). The pertinent part of Shell Oil
that the Ninth Circuit cited in Burlington notes that arranger liability can be im-
posed on a party who, although not in literal physical ownership or possession of a
hazardous substance, had the obligation to exercise control over the disposal and/
2009] 295
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broad arranger case because it involved a situation where the par-
ties "did contract for the sale or transfer of hazardous substances
that were then disposed of."'142 Additionally, citing CDMG, the
Ninth Circuit found that because CERCLA's definition of "disposal"
includes unintentional processes such as "leaking," Shell may be lia-
ble even if it had no intent to dispose of the chemicals.1 43 That
Shell arranged for a transaction in which there would necessarily be
some form of leaking or spilling was enough to impose liability.' 4 4
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Shell's argument that
the company was not liable as an arranger because it did not have
ownership or control over the hazardous chemicals. 145 The Ninth
Circuit held that while control is a pertinent element in finding a
party to be an arranger, it is not a crucial element. 146 In Shell Oil,
the absence of any control or ownership "was a clue concerning
whether the sales transaction contemplated disposal as an inherent
part of the transaction.' ' 147 Here, Shell was the owner of the chemi-
cals at the time the sale was entered into with B&B, was aware that
chemical spills occurred and tried to exercise authority over B&B's
or was the source of the harmful substances or "managed its disposal." See Shell Oil,
294 F.3d at 1058.
142. Burlington, 520 F.3d at 948-49 (noting situations where broad arranger
liability arises). For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's arranger analysis, see
infra notes 158-99 and accompanying text.
143. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 949 (citing United States v. CDMG Realty, Co.,
96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996)) (holding "leaking" does not require intent or
active human conduct). The opinion in CDMG, which the Ninth Circuit in Bur-
lington applied in support of its contention that disposal under CERCLA may not
acquire an affirmative act, only stated that the court will avoid the question if dis-
posal always requires "active human conduct." CDMG, 294 F.3d at 714. Neverthe-
less, the court in CDMG stated emphatically that under CERCLA, "leaking" and
"spilling" should be read to require active human conduct. Id. at 714. For further
discussion of CDMG, see supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text; for a critical
analysis of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of CDMG, see infra notes 177-81 and
accompanying text.
144. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 949 (holding Shell liable as arranger despite
no intent to dispose chemicals). The Ninth Circuit bolstered its finding that
Shell's lack of intent to dispose did not matter in this case, by noting that leaks
were "inherent in the transfer process arranged by Shell and contemporaneous
with that process." Id. at 950. Further, Shell delivered the chemicals knowing
leaks were likely during the transfer process and Shell gave advice and supervision
regarding transfer and storage of the chemicals. Id. Thus, disposal was a "neces-
sary part of the whole process." Id. For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in applying arranger liability, see infra notes 166-94 and accompanying
text.
145. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 950 (noting Shell's argument that lack of con-
trol or ownership means no arranger liability).
146. See id. at 951 (holding CERCLA does not require party to own hazardous
wastes when it arranged for transaction or at time of transfer of ownership).
147. Id. (distinguishing from Shell Oil). For discussion of the facts of Shell Oil,
see supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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handling of the chemicals.1 48 As a result, the Ninth Circuit deemed
this sufficient to classify Shell as an arranger. 149
C. Dissent
Judge Bea wrote a strongly worded dissent in response to the
Ninth Circuit's ruling.15 0 In it, Judge Bea noted that the majority
had held that a court might find a reasonable basis for divisibility
based on volumetric, chronological, geographic, and/or other
types of evidence.1 51 Yet here, the majority ruled that evidence
presented on these considerations were "legally insufficient" to es-
tablish divisibility.152 The dissent argued that the majority was de-
manding certainty to find divisibility of harm rather than the
accepted reasonableness standard. 153 It attacked the majority opin-
ion claiming it establishes an "impossible-to-satisfy" burden on CER-
148. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 950-51 (holding Shell as arranger under CER-
CLA). The court supplied evidence to show that Shell had authority over the dis-
posal of harmful chemicals noting that, (1) Shell chose the common carrier to
deliver the chemicals; (2) Shell altered the delivery process so that B&B had to use
large storage tanks, "thus necessitating the transfer of large quantities of chemicals
and causing leakage from corrosion of the large steel tanks;" (3) Shell provided
rebates to B&B for improvements in "bulk handling and safety facilities and re-
quired an inspection by a qualified engineer;" (4) Shell often reduced purchase
price of chemicals in an amount the district court found "was linked to loss from
leakage[;]" and (5) Shell gave B&B a manual and checklist of the manual's re-
quirements to make sure that "D-D tanks were being operated in accordance with
Shell's safety instructions." Id.
149. See id. at 951 (finding evidence demonstrated Shell's arranger liability
under CERCLA). For a critical look at the Ninth Circuit's arranger analysis, see
infra notes 171-99 and accompanying text.
150. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 952 (Bea, J., dissenting) (criticizing harshness
of majority's ruling). Judge Bea's dissent stated that the majority opinion applies
"impossible-to-satisfy burdens on CERCLA defendants", which Congress did not
intend. Id.
151. See id. at 956 (noting majority's standard to find divisibility); see also id. at
936 n.18 (majority opinion) (finding volumetric, chronological, other types of evi-
dence and geography appropriate to establish divisibility).
152. See id. at 956-57 (Bea, J., dissenting) (discussing problems majority's find-
ings). The dissent noted that the majority found no error in the district court's
fact finding and offered no authoritative citations to support its claim that the
district court's use of periods of ownership, percentages of land and types of haz-
ardous materials to support finding a reasonable basis for apportionment was "le-
gally insufficient." Id. at 956. For background on evidence used to establish
divisibility, see supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
153. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 958 (Bea, J., dissenting) (stating majority opin-
ion replaced reasonableness for certainty standard). Judge Bea noted that the fac-
tors the district court used to establish a basis for apportionment found support in
the Restatement and in other circuit courts. Id.
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CLA defendants and imposes 'joint and several liability on
CERCLA defendants where Congress did not so intend."' 5 4
Moreover, the dissent asserted that Shell was not an arranger
because it did not intentionally "arrange for disposal." 155 At most,
Shell had influence over the disposal process, but exercised neither
ownership nor control.156 Furthermore, the dissent stated that the
majority's imposition of arranger liability on a "mere seller" of
chemicals, which transferred control of the chemicals to another
company "upon delivery and before spillage occurred, goes far be-




The Ninth Circuit criticized the district court for using the
"simplest of considerations" in finding that the harm at the Arvin
site was divisible. 158 Nevertheless, the district court's methods in
establishing divisibility of harm find support in the Restatement
and prior case law. 159 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's broad inter-
pretation of arranger liability conflicts with the decisions of other
154. Id. at 952 (stating majority ruling placed impossible-to-satisfy burdens on
defendants).
155. See id. at 961 (discussing role of intent in arranger liability). Even if the
word "disposal" may have some passive connotations, CERCLA demands a party
arrange for disposal of hazardous substances and not only arrange for the sale of
hazardous substances. Id. This implies "an intentional action toward achieving the
purpose: disposal." Id.
156. See id. at 961-62 (stating control is crucial in arranger analysis). Judge
Bea stated, "that leakage may occur during the transfer of D-D from the common
carrier to B & B's storage tanks cannot mean that Shell, as a seller, arrangedfor such
leakage." Id. Although Shell did offer B&B rebates for improvements in safety and
handling of the chemicals and provided B&B with a safety manual and a checklist
on how to handle the chemicals, "Shell did not own or operate the ... facility, nor
did any Shell employees play a role in the D-D transfer. . . .Shell relinquished
control over the D-D once the common carrier arrived at the B & B site and before
the transfer of D-D." Id. at 962.
157. Id. at 954 (discussing potential impact of Ninth Circuit ruling). For a
further discussion on the potential impact of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, see infra
notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
158. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 943 (majority opinion) (ruling evidence inade-
quate to find divisibility).
159. Compare id. at 958 (Bea, J., dissenting) (stating land percentages reasona-
ble basis for apportionment), with id. at 943 (majority opinion) (stating land per-
centages are reasonable basis for apportionment). The majority in Burlington
found that percentage of land could not be a reasonable basis for apportionment
because "it does not provide a minimally reliable basis for tracing the proportion
of leakage, contamination, or cleanup costs associated with the entire parcel." Id.;
see also United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 718 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
geographic considerations appropriate in divisibility analysis).
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circuits, and misinterprets the plain meaning of words found in
CERCLA's arranger provision. 160
A. Apportionment/Divisibility
Although the harm in environmental pollution cases may be
impossible to sever "into distinct parts," the Restatement provides
an avenue for apportionment. 61 The Restatement gives an exam-
ple where cattle owned by two or more farmers trespass on a plain-
tiff's land and trample the plaintiffs crops. 162 Although "the
aggregate harm is a lost crop[,]" it may "be apportioned among the
owners of the cattle, on the basis of the number owned by each,
and the reasonable assumption that the respective harm done is
proportionate to that number."'163 Despite the difficulty of pre-
cisely determining the harm caused by each cow, joint and several
liability is nonetheless improper when a reasonable basis for divisi-
bility exists (e.g., number of cattle owned by each defendant). 164
The Ninth Circuit admits that percentage of land owned by
each party, time of ownership and volumetric considerations are
reasonable, albeit imprecise, bases for the apportionment of
harm. 165 Thus, because CERCLA only requires evidence sufficient
160. For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of arranger
liability, see supra notes 158-59, see infra notes 161-99 and accompanying text.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A(1) cmt. d (1965) (noting
example of reasonable division); see also Hercules, 247 F.3d at 718 (discussing divisi-
bility of harm). The court in Hercules noted that while environmental pollution
cases involve commingling of contaminants, that does not automatically mean ap-
portionment of harm is impossible or inappropriate. Id. For background on the
Restatement as it applies to CERCLA, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433A(1) cmt. d (1965) (noting
apportionment possible despite aggregate harm).
163. Id. (discussing apportionment of harm); see also In re Bell Petroleum Servs.,
3 F.3d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting examples of divisible harms).
164. See Bell 3 F.3d at 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing Restatement standard
for divisibility); see also Burlington, 520 F.3d at 958 (Bea, J., dissenting) (discussing
cattle example in Restatement). It is important to note that CERCLA does not
have a causation requirement to find liability. See Oswald, supra note 7, at 319
(discussing causation in CERCLA). Nevertheless, principles of causation are used
in deciding apportionment. See Aaron Gershonowitz, Joint and Several Liability in
Superfund Actions: When is Environmental Harm Divisible? PRPs Who Want to Be Cows,
14 FoRDHuAM ENVTL. L. REv. 207, 236-37 (2003). The Ninth Circuit itself stated that
the defendant could avoid joint and several liability by showing that it caused "only
a divisible portion of the harm." Burlington, 520 F.3d at 934 (majority opinion)
(quoting Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2001)).
For background on the role of causation in CERCLA, see supra notes 54-56 and
accompanying text.
165. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 936 n.18 (holding volumetric, chronological
and geographic considerations appropriate to prove divisibility); see also Hercules,
2009]
25
Rodkin: Deciphering CERCLA's Vocabulary: United States v. Burlington - Re
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009
300 VIi.ANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XX: p. 275
to show that the environmental harm is reasonably divisible, the
district court, whose factual findings are undisputed, was correct in
apportioning harm among the defendants instead of imposing joint
and several liability upon them. 166 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's
emphasis on precise records, which it admits may be impractical for
companies to keep, requires proof beyond a preponderance of the
evidence.1 67 Under a near certainty standard, implicitly proposed
by the Ninth Circuit, the imposition of joint and several liability
becomes nearly automatic for CERCLA defendants. 168 Yet, this was
not Congress's intent. 69 If Congress wanted a stricter standard, it
would have articulated one instead of merely expecting courts to
glean a reasonableness standard from the Restatement. 170
B. Shell's Arranger Liability
Fundamental to the Ninth Circuit's ruling was its broad inter-
pretation of arranger liability. 171 In finding that a party may be an
arranger under CERCLA despite having no intent to dispose of haz-
247 F.3d at 718 (holding relative quantities of waste may prove divisibility even
when contaminants commingle).
166. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 956 (Bea, J., dissenting) (discussing majority
rejection of district court divisibility analysis). Judge Bea in her dissent noted that
the majority agreed that evidence such as percentage of land owned by each party
is a reasonable basis for apportionment but ruled that here, such pieces of evi-
dence were "the simples of considerations" and legally insufficient. Id. The Ninth
Circuit specifically noted that it did not find fault with the district court's factfind-
ing in regards to the various evidence used to support divisibility. Id. at 943 (ma-
jority opinion).
167. See Bell 3 F.3d at 904 (rejecting greater proof to support divisibility). In
Bell, despite defendant Sequa's records as to its hazardous waste activities being
incomplete, the majority still found a reasonable basis for apportionment, specifi-
cally rejecting the dissent's reasoning because it would require near certainty. Id.
at 904 n.19. For a discussion of Ninth Circuit's record-keeping requirements, see
supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
168. See Bell, 3 F.3d at 904 n.19 (holding evidence allowing rough approxima-
tion of harm by each party sufficient). For a discussion of facts and reasoning in
Bell, see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
169. See Bell, 3 F.3d at 904 n.19 (discussing Congress' intent for joint and sev-
eral liability in CERCLA).
170. See id. (discussing Congressional intent); see also United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130, at *232 (E.D. Cal. July 14,
2003) (noting Restatement is starting point in CERCLA analysis). For a further
discussion of how Congress intended courts to analyze CERCLA cases, see supra
notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
171. See Dupont, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing broad arranger liability).
For further background on arranger liability, see supra notes 80-103 and accompa-
nying text.
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ardous substances, the Ninth Circuit improperly applied the hold-
ing in CDMG and other CERCLA precedents. 172
1. Defining "Arranger"
The United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit
courts of appeals often cite to dictionaries to ascertain the mean-
ings of "undefined statutory terms." 17 3 Webster's Unabridged Diction-
ary defines "arrange" as to "plan," "make preparations for" and "to
put in correct. . . or desired order. ' 174 These definitions for "ar-
range" suggest an element of intent. 75 Furthermore, and in con-
trast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Burlington, the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits also view "arrange" as requiring intent.176
CERCLA imposes arranger liability when a party has "arranged
for disposal... of a hazardous substance."' 177 The Ninth Circuit mis-
interpreted CDMG's view of CERCLA's arranger provision as sup-
porting the notion that unintentional processes such as leaking and
spilling (which are included in CERCLA's definition of "disposal"),
"indicate that 'disposal' need not be purposeful."' 78 CDMG how-
ever, held that "leaking" and "spilling" required "affirmative human
conduct."'179 The Ninth Circuit's application of broad arranger lia-
172. See United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 949 (9th
Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted) (holding "leaking" does not require intent
or active human conduct). But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962
F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding arranger must have some actual involvement
in disposing waste).
173. See Dupont, supra note 14, at 19-20 (discussing dictionary definitions of
words in CERCLA).
174. Id. at 19 (referencing dictionary to define "arrange"); see also Burlington,
520 F.3d at 961 (Bea, J., dissenting) (referencing dictionary to define "arrange").
Judge Bea relied on an ordinary dictionary to define "arrange" as "to make prepa-
rations for." Id. at 961. Judge Bea noted, "it is an oxymoron for an entity uninten-
tionally to make preparations for disposal." Id.
175. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 961. (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting dictionary
definitions denote intent).
176. See Gershonowitz, supra note 9, at 157 (discussing circuit courts' rulings
on arranger liability); see also WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY,
UNABRIDGED 121 (1986 ed.) (defining "arrange").
177. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3) (2006) (emphasis added) (listing parties poten-
tially liable under CERCLA).
178. Dupont, supra note 14, at 16-19 (discussing Ninth Circuit misconstruc-
tion of "disposal"); see also Burlington, 520 F.3d at 949 (ruling intent not needed for
"disposal"); see also United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996)
(avoiding whether disposal always requires affirmative act). In CDMG, the court
stated that while it need not rule on the issue of whether "disposal" always requires
an affirmative human act, words used in CERCLA strongly suggest that an affirma-
tive act is needed to find that a party disposed of a hazardous substance. Id. at 713.
179. See CDMG, 96 F.3d at 714 (finding strong implication "leaking" and
.spilling" requires intentional act). For background on CDMG, see supra notes 82-
95 and accompanying text.
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bility, whereby a party may be liable as a CERCLA arranger for inad-
vertent spills, is, therefore, untenable if "leaking" is an affirmative
rather than a passive act.180 Moreover, it seems illogical to define
"disposal" under CERCLA as including accidental spills, because no
one would "arrange" for such an occurrence.181
2. A Question of Ownership and Control
The Ninth Circuit suggested that a party is liable as an arranger
if it sells hazardous substances to another party "Free on Board"
Yet, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider that a product delivered
F.O.B. results in stewardship over the product passing to the ac-
cepting party.' 8 2 Under CERCLA, a party must own or possess the
substances "intended to be disposed of by a third party."' 8 3
The Ninth Circuit would likely, and correctly, retort that par-
ties do not avoid arranger liability by simply "labeling the arrange-
ment a sale."18 4 Nevertheless, the record evidence indicates that
Shell was free from responsibility for the hazardous chemicals and
did not exercise control over the chemicals' disposal; thus, impos-
ing arranger liability was inappropriate.
185
180. See Meline MacCurdy, "Useful Product" Exception Rejected and CERCLA
Claim Against Chemical Manufacturer Is Allowed to Proceed, Jan. 23, 2008, http://
www.martenlaw.com/news/?20080123-cercla-exception-rejected (explaining con-
cept of broad arranger liability). The author, citing Burlington, states that "drawing
on the inclusion of the passive term 'leaking' in CERCLA's definition of disposal,
courts have held parties liable as arrangers under this theory even when they had
no intent to dispose of the product." Id.
181. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding accidental spills not included in definition of disposal).
182. See id. (criticizing Ninth Circuit decision imposing arranger liability).
183. Id. at 18 (noting requirements for arranger liability); see also Ger-
shonowitz, supra note 9, at 148 (listing arranger as potentially liable party); see also
United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 955 (9th Cir. 2008)
(Bea, J. dissenting) (noting district court finding of stewardship of D-D passing
from Shell to B&B).
184. See REGULATED SUBSTANCES AND WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 54,
§ 31.01 (discussing arranger liability in context of sales); see also Burlington, 520
F.3d at 951 (finding no requirement of ownership at time of disposal). The Ninth
Circuit stated that requiring ownership at the time of disposal would make it too
easy for a party to avoid arranger liability through a sale of its responsibility over
hazardous substances. Id.
185. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 962 (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting stewardship
passed to B&B at delivery); see also Dupont, supra note 14, at 18-19 (criticizing
imposition of arranger liability). Mr. Dupont stated that the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion threatens to turn any chemical manufacturer into a "CERCLA-liable guaran-
tor for the operations of every purchaser." Id. at 18. But see Burlington, 520 F.3d at
948 (majority opinion) (defining arranger liability expansively). The Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled that a party is an arranger where "disposal of hazardous wastes is a fore-
seeable by-product of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to PRP
status." Id.
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Additionally, the Ninth Circuit treated control over hazardous
substance disposal as a pertinent, but not crucial, factor in deter-
mining arranger liability, contradicting the decision in Shell Oil.186
It came to this conclusion by stating that the court in Shell Oil
viewed control as "crucial" because, "the government never owned
the chemicals before disposal occurred. ' 18 7 Control over the haz-
ardous substances was therefore necessary to determine whether
the government could have "arranged" for disposal.188
Yet, Shell Oil and other court decisions involving CERCLA are
not as limited as the Ninth Circuit suggests.18 9 Shell Oil is explicit in
holding that control is a "crucial element in determining whether a
party is an arranger."' 90 Previous court rulings also establish that a
party is not liable as an arranger when it did not participate in the
disposal of hazardous substances and did not decide how, if, or
when hazardous materials should be disposed. 19' Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit stretched the definition of "control," even as a mere
pertinent factor, in finding that Shell shared responsibility for dis-
posal because it seemed aware that there were chemical spills at
every delivery to B&B and because Shell provided suggestions to
186. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 951 (holding ownership and control helpful,
not dispositive to find arranger liability). But see United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294
F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding control crucial element to determine
whether party is arranger).
187. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 951 (distinguishing facts of case from Shell Oil).
For discussion of the facts in Shell Oil, see supra notes 96-100 and accompanying
text.
188. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 951 (distinguishing facts of case from Shell Oil).
The Ninth Circuit, in distinguishing this case from Shell Oil, pointed out that in
Shell Oil, the absence "of any ownership or control was a clue concerning whether
the sales transaction necessarily contemplated disposal as an inherent part of the
transaction." Id. (emphasis in original). In contrast, "Shell ... owned the chemi-
cals at the time the sale was entered into." Id.
189. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1055 (ruling control crucial element in deter-
mining arranger liability).
190. See id. (finding control crucial element to determine whether party is
arranger); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Aamco Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding obligation to control disposal of hazardous substances suffi-
cient to find arranger liability).
191. See Howard W. Ashcraft, CERCLA "Arranger" Liability: Emerging Risk for
Environmental Consultants, 7 ARCHITEcrs/ENGINEERS PROF. NETWORK (1994), http:/
/www.aepronet.org/pn/vol7-no2.html#author, (noting court opinions regarding
importance of control in establishing arranger liability); see also Gen. Elec. Co., 962
F.2d at 286-87 (ruling defendants not liable as arrangers because no evidence ex-
isted that they exercised authority over disposal decisions); see also Hassayampa
Steering Comm. v. Arizona, 768 F. Supp. 697, 701-02 (D. Ariz. 1991) (holding al-
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B&B for handling the chemicals. 192 As the dissent pointed out,
Shell's actions are insufficient to show actual control over the dispo-
sal process. 193 Arranger liability ends with the party that "both
owned the hazardous waste and made the crucial decision of how it
would be disposed."' 194
The undisputed facts establish that stewardship of the chemi-
cals passed from Shell to B&B once the chemicals arrived F.O.B. at
the B&B facility.19 5 Additionally, only B&B employees actually han-
dled the chemicals upon delivery and at every point thereafter. 19 6
Furthermore, by agreement between the parties, once the chemi-
cals arrived at the facility, it was B&B's responsibility to handle them
safely and according to government regulations. 19 7 Shell ceased to
own the chemicals once the carrier trucks arrived F.O.B. at the
Arvin site, and Shell was not the party responsible for their disposal;
therefore, it is not an arranger. 98
VI. IMPACT
Shell might have known that B&B was inept at handling the
chemicals and that B&B was not complying with either Shell's or
the government's safety recommendations and regulations. 99 The
Ninth Circuit decision, however, threatens to make every chemical
manufacturer a "CERCLA-liable guarantor for the operations of
every purchaser with a less than stellar environmental record."200
In the words of the dissent, the majority's broad application of ar-
ranger liability "is tantamount to saying that a bartender 'arranges
192. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 951 (holding Shell's knowledge of and re-
sponse to continuing chemical spills sufficient exercise of control over disposal).
For a further discussion of Shell's knowledge of and response to the chemical
spills, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
193. See Burlington, 520 F.3d at 963 (Bea, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
reasoning as overly broad). For a further discussion of the dissent's analysis, see
supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
194. Ashcraft, supra note 192 (discussing limits of arranger liability).
195. See United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23130, at *65 (E.D. Cal., July 14, 2003) (finding intent of contract trans-
ferred stewardship from Shell to B&B); see also Burlington, 520 F.3d at 962 (Bea, J.,
dissenting) (noting district court's factual findings not disputed).
196. See Atchison, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23130, at **68-72 (discussing process
of chemical transfer between Shell and B&B).
197. See id. at **193-94 (discussing agreement between Shell and B&B on han-
dling transfer of chemicals).
198. For further background and discussion on arranger liability, see supra
notes 80-103, 140-49, 155-57, 171-98 and accompanying text.
199. See Dupont, supra note 14, at 18 (noting Shell was aware or should have
been aware of B&B's careless handling of chemicals).
200. See id. (discussing implications of broad form of arranger liability).
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for the disposal' of bourbon onto the bar when he sells a glass of
bourbon F.O.B. patron, who, while carelessly lifting the glass, spills
the bourbon."20 1
This decision could also create inter-circuit splits in an area
where uniformity of interpretation is tantamount.20 2 For example,
there may be new disagreements as to what is a "reasonable" basis
for divisibility.20 3 Should the Ninth Circuit's divisibility analysis
gain both widespread acceptance and U.S. Supreme Court ap-
proval, imposition of joint and several liability will become nearly
automatic on CERCLA defendants.20 4 As a result, future CERCLA
defendants, would be more likely to seek early settlement with the
EPA.
2 0 5
Nevertheless, an eight-judge dissent from the petition to re-
hear the case en banc and the conflict created with other circuits
may call into question the viability of the Ninth Circuit's ruling. 20 6
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's refusal to consult common dictionary
definitions of terms like "arrange" and "disposal" stands in contrast
to recent U.S. Supreme Court and circuit court opinions. 20 7 Some
201. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 961 n.20
(9th Cir. 2008) (Bea, J., dissenting) (commenting on majority application of ar-
ranger liability). The dissent found the majority application of arranger liability
far too broad, noting that prior case law suggests that without finding more evi-
dence that a transaction included "an 'arrangement' for the ultimate disposal of a
hazardous substance, CERCLA liability [can]not be imposed." Id. at 961 (citation
omitted).
202. See id. at 963 (noting importance of avoiding circuit-splits in interpreting
CERCLA); see also Oswald, supra note 7, at 325-26 (discussing Congressional intent
for courts to develop uniform interpretations for CERCLA). For a background on
Congress's purpose in enacting CERCLA, see supra notes 1-3, 70-72 and accompa-
nying text.
203. See In reBellPetroleum Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 904 n.19 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding
reasonable basis for divisibility does not require more than preponderance of
evidence).
204. See id. (rejecting automatic imposition ofjoint and several liability as con-
trary to Congressional intent). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Burlington seems to
concur with the dissent in Bell, requiring a higher evidentiary burden for CERCLA
defendants to avoid joint and several liability. Id. (rejecting dissent's reasoning).
For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasons for imposing joint and sev-
eral liability, see supra notes 104-49 and accompanying text.
205. See Feldman & Crane, supra note 6 (noting heavy burden in proving di-
visibility). For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's divisibility analysis, see supra
notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
206. See Dupont, supra note 14, at 19-20 (discussing potential impact of Bur-
lington). For background on the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Burlington, see supra
notes 104-49 and accompanying text.
207. See id. (noting decisions of other courts).
2009]
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scholars view the decision as "legally still-born," which raises doubt
about whether Burlington will survive Supreme Court scrutiny.
208
For CERCLA defendants within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction
however, avoiding liability will become increasingly difficult.20 9 Re-
cently, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Califor-
nia followed the reasoning in Burlington and imposed CERCLA
liability on a chemical manufacturer. 210  The court ruled that,
"neither ownership nor control of the hazardous substance at the
time of disposal is necessary. . . an arranger need only own the
chemical when entering into the sales transaction."2 11 If the Su-
preme Court upholds Burlington, chemical manufacturers through-
out the United States will likely face the unenviable task of
defending themselves under a greatly expanded concept of ar-
ranger liability.2 12
Benjamin J. Rodkin *
208. See id. at 20 (discussing repercussions of Ninth Circuit decision). For
background information on how other courts have analyzed arranger liability in
the CERCLA context, see supra notes 80-103 and accompanying text.
209. See MacCurdy, supra note 180 (discussing recent court ruling following
Burlington). The author noted that the Ninth Circuit's expansive interpretation of
arranger liability threatens to ensnare a broader category of parties and makes it
very difficult for CERCLA defendants to avoid being held an arranger. Id.
210. See id. (noting court's holding in case).
211. United States v. Lyon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94329, at *19 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 14, 2007).In this case, Lyon, which owned land upon which a dry cleaning
business was operated, was sued by the EPA pursuant to CERCLA for environmen-
tal contamination caused by chemical disposal from the dry cleaning business. See
id. at *4. Lyon subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Vulcan, a manu-
facturer of a chemical, PCE, commonly used in dry cleaning. See id. at *4-5. Lyon
claimed that Vulcan was liable as a CERCLA arranger because Vulcan manufac-
tured a chemical which was then sold to distributors and then resold to the dry
cleaning businesses, which thereafter disposed of it. See id. at *4-6. Vulcan argued
the claims against it should be dismissed because Lyon failed to show that Vulcan
owned, possessed, or had either the authority or the duty to dispose of the chemi-
cal. See id. at *17. The court rejected Vulcan's argument, holding that ownership
or control at the time of disposal is not necessary to find a manufacturer liable as
an arranger under CERCLA. See id. at *19. (citing Burlington, 520 F.3d at 809-10.
As long as a manufacturer owned the chemical when entering into a sales transac-
tion, it could be found to be an arranger. See id. That Lyon's complaint alleged
Vulcan sold PCE to distributors "reveals sufficient ownership under Burlington
Northern" and therefore Lyon's complaint can go forward. See id.
212. See MacCurdy, supra note 180 (discussing impact of Burlington and Lyon).
For a critical analysis of Burlington, see supra notes 158-99 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Uni-
versity of Maryland - College Park.
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